Volume 33, Issue 2

This Article examines regulatory failures at the U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission (NRC) that were identified after the Fukushima nuclear accident. Post-Fukushima analysis uncovered multiple areas of inadequate reactor oversight—earthquake and flooding hazards, emergency preparedness, and risks from potential power loss and spent fuel pool fires. Top level managers within the agency further found the NRC’s regulation of severe accidents to be a “patchwork” that employed inconsistent standards and failed to require operating reactors to address updated risk analysis.

“The critical issues of sexual violence and sexual assault have right-fully gained greater attention at universities and colleges in our country.  Though these issues are not confined to university campuses, a few key reasons help explain the emphasis on sexual violence and sexual assault, as well as sexual harassment, within the higher education world. First, at many institutions of higher education, vast numbers of young adults live independently and in close proximity to one another for the first time. Second, federal law imposes reporting, response, and prevention requirements on colleges and universities that are not present in other contexts. And third, students, parents, faculty, staff, alumni, members of governing boards, members of the community, and members of the state and federal governments all appropriately expect that colleges and universities will provide a safe and secure learning and working environment.”

This Note challenges the assumption that the Solicitor General’s (SG’s) litigating authority is ineffective in controlling agency policymaking. When other political control mechanisms are weak, the SG’s litigating authority may provide the most effective means of ensuring that an agency’s policies agree with the Administration’s preferences. Patent law exemplifies this dynamic. The Patent and Trademark Office’s (PTO’s) specialization limits the effectiveness of policy and budgetary review and the appointment and removal powers. However, the SG’s litigating authority compensates for this weakness in direct oversight by facilitating indirect review of the PTO’s policies. Applying the fire-alarm model of political control, I argue that the SG acts as the Administration’s fire dispatcher. The SG raises the alarm when the PTO diverges from the Administration’s preferences, allowing the Administration and other government interests to intervene. In doing so, the SG decides which alarms are genuine, which fires can be extinguished, and when and where fire fighters should be allocated. Nevertheless, the SG’s increasing influence threatens to swallow the PTO’s expertise.