A discrepancy in the guidance accompanying the Consumer Financial Protection Bureau’s (“CFPB”) new “remittance transfer” rule may unnecessarily apply regulatory provisions to certain mobile payments, potentially raising the barrier to adoption of this new technology. The CFPB recently issued a final rule to implement section 1073 of the Dodd-Frank Wall Street Reform and Consumer Protection Act (the “Dodd-Frank Act”). The rule and its accompanying guidance exclude in-person payment card transactions, but fail to exclude functionally-equivalent mobile payments. A simple regulatory solution could both reduce obstacles to the development of an efficient payment system and preserve necessary consumer protections. By drawing careful distinctions between the traditional remittance transfer and the in-person mobile payment made abroad, this article suggests that the guidance should be amended to explicitly exclude functionally-similar mobile payments.

In the wake of the tragic shooting at Sandy Hook Elementary School in Newtown, CT, President Obama and others have called for legislative measures to combat gun violence. So far, most of these proposals have focused on three principal approaches: (1) making all firearms transfers subject to National Instant Criminal Background Check System (NICS) approval, (2) limiting firearm magazine capacity, and (3) banning models of semi-automatic firearms that possess certain “military purpose” features.

We strongly support the first of these approaches, which would eliminate the “gun show loophole” and require background checks for private party firearm sales. Instead of bans on magazine capacity and “military purpose” features, however—bans which together are commonly known as an “Assault Weapons Ban” (AWB)—we propose a five-year, renewable “Restricted Firearms License” program for the ownership of handguns, centerfire semi-automatic rifles, and semi-automatic shotguns.

In Crawford v. Washington, the Supreme Court radically transformed Confrontation Clause doctrine. Immediately after Crawford, commentators predicted dire consequences for criminal prosecutions. These predictions have been renewed after each refinement of Crawford’s doctrine. So far, however, the sky has not fallen, because prosecutors and courts have managed to reconcile Crawford’s robust confrontation rights with the practical imperatives of criminal prosecution.

This Essay argues that the Court’s recent decision in Bullcoming v. New Mexico threatens the uneasy balance between prosecutorial needs and the Crawford line. Specifically, Bullcoming could be used to exclude DNA database evidence in prosecuting cold cases. DNA evidence has been used in criminal prosecutions for only a few decades, but it has revolutionized criminal justice during that time. DNA evidence has been particularly important for prosecuting rape cases, which historically have low conviction rates. Prosecutors should therefore be concerned that they might lose an essential tool for prosecuting rape cases and seeking justice for victims. Defense attorneys have a stake, too. When prosecutors lose access to DNA evidence, they are more likely to turn to less reliable eyewitness testimony and circumstantial evidence.

I argue that state legislatures and Congress can ensure that DNA evidence is available in cold-case prosecutions while simultaneously respecting defen­dants’ post-Crawford confrontation rights. Specifically, both state and federal policy makers should alter rules of evidence to include decades-old DNA database evidence under ancient document exceptions to hearsay rules.